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Punitive Restoration and Restorative Justice 
Thom Brooks 
Durham Law School, Durham University, Durham, UK 
Abstract. Criminal justice policy faces the twin challenges of improving our crime reduction 
efforts while increasing public confidence. These challenges are exacerbated by the fact that 
at least some measures popular with the public are counterproductive to greater crime 
reduction. How to achieve greater crime reduction without sacrificing public confidence? 
While restorative justice approaches offer a promising alternative to traditional sentencing 
with the potential to achieve these goals, they suffer from several serious obstacles not least 
their relatively limited applicability, flexibility and public support. Punitive restoration is a 
new and distinctive idea about restorative justice modelled on an important principle of 
stakeholding which states that those who have a stake in penal outcomes should have a say 
about them. Punitive restoration is restorative insofar as it aims to achieve the restoration of 
rights infringed or threatened by criminal offences. Punitive restoration is punitive insofar as 
the available options for this agreement are more punitive than found in most restorative 
justice approaches, such as the option of some form of hard treatment. Punitive restoration 
sheds new light on how we may meet the twin challenges of improving our efforts to reduce 
reoffending without sacrificing public confidence demonstrating how restorative practices 
can be embedded deeper within the criminal justice system. 
 
Key words: Crime Reduction, Public Confidence, Punishment, Punitive Restoration, 
Restorative Justice, Stakeholding 
 
Introduction 
How can we create less reoffending with greater public confidence? These twin goals have 
proven elusive for criminal justice policymakers. While crime rates remain relatively low 
historically, sentencing decisions are increasing criticised by the public for being overly 
lenient and providing insufficient deterrence. Policymakers face two challenges. First, 
measures that reduce reoffending do not always satisfy public demands for tougher 
sentencing. Secondly, more onerous punishments can make reoffending more likely and so 
prove counterproductive. 
Restorative justice approaches are a promising alternative to traditional sentencing 
practices. Studies have found that restorative justice can produce up to 25% less reoffending 
with much higher participant satisfaction – all at much reduced costs. These approaches have 
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the potential to achieve the elusive twin goals. It is hardly surprising that restorative justice is 
increasingly popular across the political divide in Britain. 
Nonetheless, there are several obstacles that threaten to limit their wider use. The 
diversity of restorative approaches ranging from in-school rehabilitative programmes to 
victim-offender mediation that can make it difficult to identify any one model for 
implementation. Restorative justice is usually restricted to less serious offences that may 
constrain its application to more types of offending. This constraint is a product of limited 
confidence in the use of restoration for more serious crimes because imprisonment is always 
ruled out. Finally, there is disagreement about what is “restored” through any specific 
restorative approach. 
I will argue that the twin goals of achieving less reoffending with greater public 
confidence can be achieved through a distinctive restorative approach that I will call punitive 
restoration overcoming the many obstacles facing most other restorative approaches. The 
next section begins by explaining the appeal of restorative justice. The following section 
discusses the obstacles restorative justice approaches face and the problems that arise. I then 
turn to explaining how my alternative approach of punitive restoration can improve on other 
restorative approaches. This final section concludes by specifying what punitive restoration 
might entail in practice. 
 
The Diversity of Restorative Justice 
The term “restorative justice” refers to a range of approaches and not any single practice.1 It 
is more an orientation than a practice favouring the informal over the formal aiming at 
providing victims and offenders alike with a voice. Furthermore, “there is no agreement on 
the actual nature of the transformation sought by the restorative justice movement.”2 
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Different views abound about what is “restored” and even the desired goals of restorative 
justice.  
This can make it difficult to discuss because of the wide diversity of restorative 
approaches.
3
 Restorative justice approaches are applied in schools,
4
 prison interventions
5
 and 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.6 Restorative justice approaches are 
also found in applications that are the focus of this essay: restorative justice as an alternative 
to traditional sentencing, including victim-offender mediation and restorative conferencing as 
practiced in England and Wales.
7
 
The golden thread—or “conceptual umbrella”—uniting all of these diverse 
approaches to restorative justice is their focus on bringing closure to a conflict through 
informal, but not unstructured, deliberation with the aim of enabling both understanding and 
healing.
8
 Perhaps the best known working definition of restorative justice approaches is by T. 
F. Marshall: “Restorative justice is a process whereby all parties with a stake in a particular 
offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence 
and its implications for the future.”9  
Marshall’s focus on the process of restorative justice approaches illuminates one 
distinctive difference from models of traditional sentencing. Judges and magistrates 
determine the sentencing outcomes for convicted offenders from their courtroom benches 
following a set of formal procedures. A growing concern in recent years is that these 
procedures exacerbate victim displacement, stated eloquently by John Gardner: 
 
we seem to have lost sight of the origins of the criminal law as a response to the 
activities of victims, together with their families, associates and supporters. The blood 
feud, the vendetta, the duel, the revenge, the lynching for the elimination of these 
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modes of retaliation, more than anything else, the criminal law as we know it today 
came into existence.
10
 
 
The challenge is to discover some process whereby the victim can play a more substantive 
role in criminal justice without returning to the many problems that led to victim 
displacement.  
Restorative justice approaches, such a victim-offender mediation and restorative 
conferencing, suggest such a process – and they provide us with an alternative to the 
traditional, formal procedures for sentencing. Restorative approaches endorse a more 
informal means to secure outcomes located away from courtrooms led by a trained facilitator 
instead of a judge or magistrate. Facilitators conduct meetings that require the offender to 
admit guilt beforehand. Offenders are permitted a legal representative although they are not 
normally present and offenders are expected to engage directly with others present.  
Both mediation and conferences begins by the facilitator clarifying the parameters and 
purposes of the meeting with guidance available from the Restorative Justice Council.
11
 The 
victim is then provided an opportunity to speak next and address the offender to explain the 
impact of the offender’s crime on her. Restorative conferences next permit any members of 
the victim’s support network, such as their friends and family, as well as select members of 
the local community, to discuss how the offender’s crime impacted on them. The offender 
speaks last and expected to account for his crimes, typically including an apology to the 
victim.  
These meetings conclude by participants confirming a contract that the offender is 
asked to agree. If the offender does not or if he fails to honour its terms in full, then the next 
step can include a transfer to having the alleged offence considered in the courtroom where 
potential outcomes can be more punitive.
12
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 Restorative approaches are more than a process, but aim to provide real benefits. The 
first is that mediation and conferences lead to “restorative contracts” agreed by all parties, 
including offenders, in about every restorative meeting: studies have found contracts agreed 
in up to 98% of cases.
13
 The second benefit is the contracts agreed improve the reduction of 
reoffending by offenders. These contracts can better target the specific needs of offenders 
because of the greater flexibility of the more informal process of restorative meetings. 
Standard outcomes include requirements that offenders attend treatment to overcome their 
substance abuse or problems with anger management, training is provided to improve 
employability and general life skills, some compensation to the victim is agreed and there is 
often some element of community sentencing included. This improved targeting of offender 
needs has been found to contribute to up to 25 per cent less reoffending than alternatives.
14
 
 Restorative approaches are found to improve our ability to address problems 
associated with victim displacement. Nils Christie argues: 
 
The victim is a particularly heavy loser in this situation. Not only has he suffered, lost 
materially or become hurt, physically or otherwise. And not only does the state take 
the compensation. But above all he has lost participation in his own case. It is the 
[state] that comes into the spotlight, not the victim. It is the [state] that describes the 
losses, not the victim.
15
 
 
Restorative justice approaches address these problems in a potentially fruitful way. Victims 
report high satisfaction with restorative approaches, especially participation in restorative 
conferencing—and this is true for all participants, including offenders.16 While victims 
regularly report feelings of alienation for cases heard in courtrooms, restorative meetings 
outside the courts provide a more informal and less intimidating context where victims are 
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encouraged to vocalise their experience of crime and its personal effects in an attempt to find 
closure in a safe and constructive environment.  
This higher satisfaction for all participants is a product of the dialogue brought about 
through restorative meetings whereby each participant has opportunities to engage with 
others to better understand the wider context of a particular crime and its effects on others 
aimed at bringing closure. Victims gain some insight into crimes committed against them and 
offenders benefit from greater knowledge about the consequences of their actions. Finally, 
restorative approaches are much less expensive than traditional sentencing. One study found 
restorative approaches saved £9 for every £1 spent.
17
 
 Restorative justice is not one practice, but a broad tent encompassing a wide diversity 
of practices. This article focuses on restorative justice approaches that are an alternative to 
sentencing. These approaches demonstrate significant promise as restorative meetings might 
achieve the benefits of improved victim satisfaction through greater participation 
opportunities, less reoffending through better targeting of offender needs and promotion of 
constructive engagement at much reduced costs. Restorative justice may be an important first 
step towards meeting the twin challenges of improving public confidence while reducing 
reoffending. 
 
The Problems with Restorative Approaches 
Restorative justice approaches suffer from several problems. This section identifies the more 
significant problems and the first—the fact of the diversity of restorative practices—has 
already been stated above. Perhaps what most restorative approaches have in common is in 
what they are not: they are not held in a courtroom, they do not follow formal procedures of 
traditional courtroom practices, they do not exclude victims from participation and so on.
18
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 The fact of restorative justice’s diversity of practices leads to the problem that to 
speak of ‘restorative justice’ is to discuss not any one single approach. This plurality of 
practices extends to the forms they can take from mediation to conferencing, but also to 
differences in dynamics in how these practices are delivered. The informality of restorative 
meetings is a key to its strength – making it easier to target offender needs – but also a 
weakness as some part of its success depends on the specific dynamics from the particular 
participants involved. While facilitators are trained to minimise such differences, they can 
and do exist.
19
 
 A second problem is the limited application of restorative justice approaches. 
Generally, these are restricted to less serious crimes by young offenders and only rarely used 
for adults.
20
 Restorative justice approaches are limited to a relatively modest set of offenders 
and crimes and so may be considered an incomplete view of punishment that does not cover 
all or even most types of offenders or crimes.
21
  
Perhaps the reason for this limited applicability is a third, related problem of limited 
confidence which may prevent restorative justice approaches being considered for more 
serious crimes. There is a concern the public may view these approaches as a “soft” option 
for more serious offences. So even if restorative approaches were proved to be more effective 
at reducing reoffending, the problem they would have is that they might be politically 
unpalatable. 
There are many recent examples of criminal justice policies receiving popular support 
that undermined crime reduction efforts. The most prominent illustration is probably 
California’s so-called “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law requiring offenders convicted of a 
third eligible criminal offence face a minimum of 25 years imprisonment.
22
 Studies confirm 
this law led to an explosion in the prison population and its associated cuts with only a 
negligible deterrent effect of no more than two per cent.
23
 Populist proposals like “Three 
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Strikes and You’re Out” indicate the public’s willingness to support more punitive penal 
policies mistakenly believing they will lead to improved crime reduction and at less cost – 
neither of which came true.
24
 
 Restorative justice’s problems of limited application and limited application are 
connected to a fourth problem, namely, that restorative alternatives to traditional sentencing 
are constrained by their limited available options. Restorative justice approaches considered 
here do not include so-called “hard treatment” options like imprisonment nor suspended 
sentences as a part of their available options for a restorative contract. Indeed, some claim 
restorative justice approaches do not offer us a view about punishment because hard 
treatment is not an option for contracts agreed at restorative meetings.
25
 
 The reason for excluding hard treatment as an option is that its use is thought to be 
counterproductive to reducing reoffending. Imprisonment is too often not the start of a 
person’s longstanding social-economic and legal problems, but their confirmation—where 
bad situations can become much worse. Common risk factors for reoffending including 
economic insecurity, employment insecurity, financial insecurity and housing insecurity to 
name only a few.
26
 These can often become exacerbated through even brief time spent in 
prison. Some research suggests the prison may even be “criminogenic” because it may 
contribute to a greater likelihood an imprisoned offender reoffends on release.
27
 
 While imprisonment can often make crime reduction more difficult, imprisonment is 
not always counterproductive to this purpose. The problem here is not that the prison is used, 
but how it is used – and how it can and should be improved. Restorative justice highlights the 
many attractions of an alternative criminal justice process where prison is not an available 
option. These approaches show that another model is possible—sometimes even preferable. 
For most proponents of restorative justice, its opposition to imprisonment is viewed as a 
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strength of its “abolitionist” position.28 Restorative approaches provide a promising process 
that might help us curtail the use of prison to ensure it is a last resort. 
 The reason for limiting options for restorative approaches to exclude the use of prison 
is connected to a final problem: the lack of clarity these approaches offer about what is 
“restored” through a specific restorative approach. Strictly speaking, restorative justice 
approaches reject the use of prison because it is held imprisonment is a barrier to 
“restoration.”29 This is a contestable empirical claim that mistakes how we find many prisons 
with how prisons should be found while raising new questions about what is meant by 
restoration.  
 Restorative justice approaches claim they enable a “restoration” of the damaged 
relationship between an offender and the wider community. But which community and who 
are the relevant members? Many argue this claim “remains shrouded in mystery.”30 For 
example, Andrew Ashworth says: 
 
If the broad aim is to restore the ‘communities affected by the crime’, as well as the 
victim and the victim’s family, this will usually mean a geographical community; but 
where an offence targets a victim because of race, religion, sexual orientation, etc., 
that will point to a different community that needs to be restored.
31
 
 
There are two concerns here. The first is the problem of identifying the appropriate 
community to be restored and the second is the problem of selecting persons from that 
community to participate in a restorative meeting. The first problem of identifying the 
appropriate community affected by a crime is significant. Restorative justice requires a 
restoration of the members within that community, but we each identify with multiple and 
sometimes overlapping communities and so it is unclear how we should choose between 
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them. These communities are rarely static and our identities are not created in a vacuum 
suggesting that even if we could identify “the community” this may be of limited practical 
benefit for the purposes of achieving restorative justice.
32
 
 A further problem concerns the idea of “restoration” itself. Restorative justice aims at 
a restoration of an offender with the wider community. This is built on a view that there is a 
wrong to be made right and an injustice between affected persons requiring closure. If this is 
the case, then it is unclear why restorative justice requires a criminal offence where there may 
be injustices requiring repair. For example, restoration may bring benefits to individuals and 
communities despite no crime has taken place. There may be a need for providing support to 
overcome addictions or enable greater financial independence – yet this support might only 
be available to “restore” those affected should there have been a crime. Short of offending, 
individuals may lack access to support they need benefiting themselves and their community. 
Another example is the case of restorative approaches used in schools for children to resolve 
conflicts and promote healing. If this is our goal, then crimes can be incidental to whether 
restoration is required. 
 Restorative justice approaches bring several potential benefits that include higher 
victim satisfaction, more effective crime reduction and at lower costs. These benefits are not 
without their own costs. Restorative justice approaches are difficult to pinpoint and provide 
anything but broad comparisons given their diversity. They have limited applicability, limited 
public confidence, operate with limited options by excluding prison and subject to a serious 
problem concerning what is “restored” and by which community.33  
Restorative justice approaches may be worth defending, but we require a new 
approach to yield the potential benefits while avoiding these obstacles. Otherwise, restorative 
justice approaches might remain an underutilised resource at the margins of mainstream 
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criminal justice policy. This situation might change if there is a new formulation of 
restorative justice that could address these challenges. 
 
The Punitive Restoration Alternative 
This section presents and defends a particular approach to achieving restorative justice in a 
novel way: the idea of punitive restoration.
34
 Punitive restoration offers a distinctive view 
about restorative justice. It is a single practice taking the form of a conference setting where 
the victim, the offender, their support networks and some local community members are 
represented. Punitive restoration is restorative insofar as it aims to achieve the restoration of 
rights infringed, or threatened, by criminal offences.
35
 This is accomplished through 
recognition of the crime as a public wrong leading to a contractual arrangement agreed by 
stakeholders. Punitive restoration is punitive because it extends the available options for a 
restorative contract to achieve restoration and this may include forms of hard treatment, such 
as drug and alcohol treatment in custody, suspended sentences or brief imprisonment. These 
claims will now be defended. 
 Restorative justice approaches lack clarity about what is to be restored and how it 
should be achieved. Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth argue that restorative justice 
“suffers from unduly sweeping definition of aims and insufficient specifications of limits” 
with a conceptually incoherent model.
36
 In fact, its claim to bring restoration to a community 
may be criticised because restorative approaches do not insist on community involvement and 
the overwhelming majority of restorative meetings are victim-offender mediations where the 
community is excluded.  
Punitive restoration operates with a more specific understanding about restoration.
37
 
The model of punitive restoration is a conference meeting, not unlike restorative 
conferencing. This is justified on grounds of an important principle of stakeholding: that 
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those who have a stake in penal outcomes should have a say in decisions about them.
38
 
Stakeholding has direct relevance for sentencing policy. Stakeholders are those individuals 
with a stake in penal outcomes. These persons include victims, if any, their support networks 
and the local community. Each marks himself or herself out as a potential stakeholder in 
virtue of his or her relative stake. 
This view of restoration endorses the primary working definition from Marshall that is 
used by most proponents of restorative justice considered above and restated here: 
“Restorative justice is a process whereby all parties with a stake in a particular offence come 
together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its 
implications for the future.”39 Restorative justice has often been understood as a process that 
brings “stakeholders” together.40 Its distinctive form as punitive restoration better guarantees 
this understanding by promoting the conference meeting and not victim-offender mediation.  
Relevant stakeholders become more easily identifiable as persons immediately 
involved or connected with a criminal offence. This does not require all such persons to 
participate, but rather that opportunities exist for persons beyond the victim and offender to 
take part. Similarly, there must be opportunities for members of the general public to take 
part. This working idea of a conference setting is without any specific recommendation on 
capping the number of persons included although feasibility may render groups of ten or 
more impractical.  
The key idea is that if restoration is worth achieving, then it should not be a private 
affair between only the victim and offender: crimes are public wrongs that affect all members 
of the community, including the support networks of victims and offenders whose voices are 
regularly left out.
41
 These individuals have a stake in the outcome that should not be silenced. 
Restorative conferencing demonstrates this model is achievable and successful: participant 
satisfaction is higher in this setting than in mediation.
42
 We should take the idea of 
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stakeholding central to restorative justice approaches more seriously and ensure that any 
restoration of offenders with their community is enabled through including the community—
as this is too often not the case.  
 So one benefit of punitive restoration is its specifying the restorative process. 
Restoration is aimed at stakeholders through a conference setting. Furthermore, we should 
recall that our focus is on alternatives to sentencing: punitive restoration is conceived an 
alternative to the formal procedures of the criminal trial and sentencing guidelines. Punitive 
restoration can then overcome an important obstacle—the diversity of restorative approaches. 
It can do this because our speaking of “punitive restoration” is linked with a particular, 
informal use of restorative justice. We can then better compare the dynamics and outcomes 
from punitive restoration given the more specified content. When referring to “punitive 
restoration,” we know which restorative practice we are talking about. 
 Another benefit is that punitive restoration can better address the issue of community 
than alternative restorative approaches. This is because punitive restoration endorses the 
principle of stakeholding where those who have a stake should have a say.
43
 There is no need 
to consider the more difficult task of discerning which type of community is most relevant for 
“restoration,” but rather focus on identifying the primary stakeholders and engage them. 
 It should be noted that orthodox restorative justice approaches typically require both 
victims and offenders to participate. An additional benefit of punitive restoration over these 
approaches is only punitive restoration can address situations of so-called “victimless” crimes 
or where a victim is either unable, or unwilling, to participate. Those offences most often 
considered “victimless,” such as possession of illegal drugs, might normally be unavailable to 
a restorative approach and the potential benefits it can offer. While there may be no specific 
victim, crimes are public wrongs where the public have a stake in how criminal offences are 
managed no matter their degree of seriousness. Punitive restoration’s principle of 
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stakeholding better helps us identify persons to participate in conference meetings and 
expand their applicability to a wider range of offences than alternative restorative approaches. 
 The public’s having a say on penal outcomes is subject to several safeguards as found 
in current restorative justice practices that punitive restoration builds upon.
44
 Offenders have 
a right to legal representation throughout. Participation by everyone from offender to victim 
and community members is voluntary. The public can contribute already to penal outcomes 
through serving on a jury or submitting a victim impact statement so having a voice on 
sentencing is not unknown.
45
 Flexibility is constrained by national guidelines providing 
necessary discretion but all outcomes must be overseen by a trained facilitator and agreed to 
by the offender to be confirmed.
46
 
 Further problems for restorative justice approaches concern their limited applicability 
to less serious offences, the limited confidence the public may have in restorative approaches 
because they may be viewed as too soft an option and their limited available options by 
excluding any use of hard treatment. Punitive restoration takes these obstacles together. It 
enables wider applicability by increasing the kind and range of available options. Punitive 
restoration does not assume that restoration must never require the use of hard treatment. 
While incarceration may often make successful crime reduction efforts more difficult, it is 
also clear that prisons can, and should, be transformed to improve their disappointing 
results.
47
 
 For example, restorative contracts regularly include an obligation on offenders to 
undertake treatment for any drug or alcohol abuse and to participate in programmes designed 
to develop their employability and life skills.
48
 There is no reason to accept these activities 
could never be delivered successfully within a prison or some other secure facility for 
particular offenders. Perhaps hard treatment should be used sparingly because its use can be 
counterproductive: this is still not grounds for avoiding custodial sentences altogether. It is a 
15 
 
realistic possibility that prisons may prove the best environment for some offenders in 
specific cases.
49
 Prisons might also be reorganized so that prison officers could become 
Personal Support Officers if provided suitable training. Such a reform would make better use 
of prison resources: these officers have most frequent contact with imprisoned offenders and 
this relationship could be harnessed to produce an improved system of pastoral support.
50
 
 Prisons can and should be transformed so incarceration does not undermine offender 
rehabilitation. Short-term imprisonment is associated with high rates of reoffending. This is a 
significant problem because most offenders receive short-term sentences of less than 12 
months and about 60% will reoffend within weeks of their release.
51
 Most offenders receiving 
short-term imprisonment do not receive any rehabilitative treatment. This is a major 
contributing factor to the likelihood these offenders will reoffend when released from prison.  
This problem may be overcome through providing effective treatment. Brief intensive 
interventions have been employed to address problems associated with drugs and offending 
were found to benefit from “significant gains in knowledge, attitudes and psychosocial 
functioning.”52 These sessions were corrections-based treatment of moderate (30 outpatient 
group sessions three days per week) or high intensity (six month residential treatment) has 
been found to yield cost savings of 1.8 to 5.7 the cost of their implementation.
53
 These 
policies suggest prisons can be reformed to better support offender rehabilitation and improve 
post-release crime reduction efforts without sacrificing cost-effectiveness. 
 Reforms like these have important relevance for punitive restoration. This is because 
offenders who have committed more serious, even violent, crimes may require more punitive 
outcomes than currently available to restorative justice approaches. For example, in England 
and Wales, the currently available restorative practices reject all uses of hard treatment 
including the imposition or its threat in contracts agreed at restorative meetings. If these 
contracts are not agreed or satisfied in full, the offender may have his case transferred for 
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consideration by a magistrate where hard treatment can become a possible outcome. Despite 
having admitted guilt in a restorative setting and apologised to the victim, the offender is 
permitted to plead not guilty where his or her failure to honour a restorative contract cannot 
be raised at trial. This current practice fails to fully respect the integrity of the restorative 
process as neither apologies nor promises are supported by any available sanction.  
Punitive restoration might permit the inclusion of a suspended sentence for 
noncompliance of a contract within the contractual agreement—this would be made clear to 
offenders upfront.
54
 This option would extend the flexibility of punitive restoration to more 
varieties of offence-types and offenders bypassing the need for a trial in cases of 
noncompliance and further reducing potential sentencing costs. Nor should this be 
problematic: offenders receiving a suspended sentence in a punitive restoration conference 
meeting would retain access to legal representation throughout, must confirm any guilt 
without coercion and agree all terms presented to him or her at the conclusion of this meeting 
for committing offences where the alternative—through the traditional formal procedures of 
the courtroom—would include options that are at least as punitive. Note that one major 
difference is that only with punitive restoration would the possibility of hard treatment be an 
issue that must be agreed by the offender prior to its use.  
Let us consider two further instances where punitive restoration might justify some 
form of hard treatment. One is the idea of prison as a form of cooling off. Recall that 
imprisonment is often not the beginning of an offender’s socio-economic and legal 
difficulties, but rather their confirmation after an extended escalation. Imprisonment is 
characteristically disruptive. A consequence is that this can end already fragile support 
networks and render an individual’s road to sustainable prosperity tenuous. This is a 
significant problem for most offenders – but not for all. Perhaps for only a small, yet 
important minority the disruption from strongly negative support networks or difficult 
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personal circumstances can provide an opportunity for offenders to take a break where they 
might become open to personal transformation possible only through a prison-like 
environment. And this could be readily knowable as offenders are assessed by probation 
officers prior to any sentencing decision anyway to ensure any allocated prison place is 
suitable for any offender to be considered for hard treatment.
55
 
A second form of hard treatment that punitive restoration might incorporate is the idea 
of less time in prison with more intensity. This addresses on the fact most offenders serve 
short-term sentences without receiving any rehabilitative treatment. These treatments are 
costly and so prison wardens normally reserve expensive rehabilitative programmes for 
offenders serving more than one year in prison: this permits sufficient time for these 
programmes to be effective. 
However, these programmes are rarely intensive and—as already noted above—such 
high intensity programmes have been found to be effective at reducing drug and alcohol 
abuse, for example.
56
 More such programmes would increase costs, but these might be 
accounted for by reducing the overall time spent in prison made possible by intensive 
rehabilitation programmes: the savings from the reduced time spent in prison overall could 
contribute to the increased costs of ensuring all inmates have access to the appropriate 
intensive rehabilitative programmes. Further savings might accrue through less reoffending 
on release if the programmes are successful. 
Punitive restoration might be objected to on the grounds that hard treatment, even for 
a few days, is a major curtailment of individual liberty which requires special safeguards only 
the formal procedures of the courtroom could satisfy. The problem with this objection is that 
only a relatively few cases are brought to trial.
57
 Thus, the vast majority of cases are never 
heard in court and so victims and others affected by a crime are not permitted opportunities to 
gain a better understanding of why crimes occurred or receive an apology from their 
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offenders. It is hardly surprising to recall the widespread dissatisfaction many victims have 
with the traditional sentencing model. Punitive restoration is a concrete approach that can 
overcome this problem by providing greater opportunities for restorative meetings where 
victims express much higher satisfaction.
58
 
Restoration might not be for everybody. Restorative justice—as an alternative to 
traditional sentencing—is typically only available to offenders with little to no past criminal 
record. Punitive restoration attempts to create a space whereby more offenders can be brought 
into a restorative approach. While more punitive options can enable restoration and expand 
potential applicability, it is not argued that punitive restoration is appropriate for all crimes, 
including the most serious violent offences. If it was used, it might undermine its goal of 
winning over public confidence. Social reality matters and punitive restoration must 
“restore”—strong public opposition to its use could damage its ability to provide some form 
of restoration. 
Moreover, punitive restoration requires a time commitment. Not all victims or 
offenders will want to take part. Community members may not wish to participate. If punitive 
restoration is to work, then its conference format requires stakeholders to come together. It is 
my contention that since restorative conferences are shown to create more strongly positive 
experiences for victims and offenders than alternatives that their wider use could extend these 
experiences for more people. Over time punitive restoration might become more regularly 
practiced as the public becomes more supportive both through positive experiences and 
results.
59
 
Punitive restoration might also be objected to for a lack of any stated purpose beyond 
its endorsing the principle of stakeholding: this may help identify relevant participants, but 
which penal purpose should inform their sentencing outcomes? Punitive restoration is more 
than an improvement over alternative approaches to restorative justice, but a concrete 
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realization of a compelling perspective on penal purposes in practice. Punishment is often 
justified in reference to a justifying aim or purpose, such as retribution, deterrence or 
rehabilitation. Philosophers disagree about which among these is most preferable despite 
general agreement that hybrid combinations of two or more purposes often suffer from 
inconsistency.
60
 This is illustrated well in Britain by s142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
which states that punishment must satisfy at least one of five penal purposes. This claim is 
restated in more recent sentencing guidelines.
61
 However, there has been no attempt to claim 
how two or more such purposes can be brought together in a coherent, unified account. This 
“penal pluralism” may be legally possible, but its practicality remains questionable.62  
Punitive restoration is one form that a unified theory of punishment might take. This is 
because it is able to bring together multiple penal purposes within a coherent, unified 
framework.
63
 For example, desert is satisfied because offenders must admit guilt without 
coercion prior to participation in a conference meeting. The penal goals of crime reduction, 
including the protection of the public, and enabling offender rehabilitation are achieved 
through targeting stakeholder needs arising from the meeting. The satisfaction of these goals 
is confirmed through the high satisfaction all participants report which suggests a general 
unanimity that the appropriate set of contractual stipulations have been agreed by all and the 
improvements in reducing reoffending suggest success in crime reduction and treatment 
consistent with deterrence and rehabilitation.
64
 The argument here is not that any such unified 
theory is best or preferable to alternative theories. Instead, it is claimed punitive restoration is 
an example of how multiple penal principles might be addressed within a coherent, unified 
account.
65
 
 
Conclusion 
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Criminal justice policy faces the twin challenges of improving our crime reduction efforts 
while increasing public confidence. These challenges are exacerbated by the fact that at least 
some measures popular with the public, such as California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” 
law, are counterproductive to improving crime reduction. How to achieve more crime 
reduction without sacrificing public confidence? 
 Restorative justice approaches offer a promising alternative to traditional sentencing 
with the potential to achieve these goals. Studies have found these approaches to yield 
significant improvements in combatting recidivism and greater satisfaction by participating 
victims at much reduced costs. Yet, restorative justice approaches suffer from several serious 
obstacles. These problems include the diversity of restorative approaches making it difficult 
to speak of any single approach leading to difficulties in making comparisons. Other 
problems include the limited applicability of restorative approaches to primarily youth 
offenders for less serious crimes, the limited flexibility of outcomes to exclude the possibility 
of imprisonment, the limited public confidence stemming from concerns restorative 
approaches are a soft option and a larger question about what is “restored” through restorative 
justice. 
 Punitive restoration is a new and distinctive idea about restorative justice. It is 
modelled on an important principle of stakeholding which states that those who have a stake 
in penal outcomes should have a say about them. Punitive restoration brings relevant 
stakeholders together, including victims, offenders and members from the local community, 
to consider together the appropriate penal outcomes. Punitive restoration is restorative insofar 
as it aims to achieve the restoration of rights infringed or threatened by criminal offences. 
This is accomplished through recognition of the crime as a public wrong leading to a 
contractual arrangement agreed by stakeholders. Punitive restoration is punitive insofar as the 
available options for this agreement are more punitive than found in most restorative justice 
21 
 
approaches, such as the option of some form of hard treatment. This expansion of options 
within a restorative framework overcomes the many obstacles that limit the application, 
flexibility and public confidence of restorative alternatives.
66
 
Punitive restoration sheds new light on how we may meet the twin challenges of 
improving our efforts to reduce reoffending without sacrificing public confidence. This 
approach further demonstrates how restorative practices can be embedded deeper within the 
criminal justice system: by making restorative practices potentially more punitive we also 
may render the system less punitive overall.
67
 Punitive restoration is an idea whose time has 
now come.
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